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1. INTRODUCTION
The economic literature suggests that the cost of government borrowing is de-
termined by macroeconomic fundamentals, especially by fiscal accounts (Mun-
dell 1963). However, the relationship between the fundamental conditions and 
sovereign risk may change during periods of high volatility on financial markets 
(Attinasi et al. 2009; Barrios et al. 2009; Von Hagen et al. 2011). Government 
bond yields demonstrated an increased variation across countries during the glo-
bal financial crisis. Contagion, defined as a change in the way fundamentals or 
other factors are priced during a crisis, had a significant impact on sovereign risk 
not only in the euro zone, but globally as well (Giordano et al. 2013; Ludwig 
2014). While there is a wide empirical literature on the drivers of sovereign risk 
in the euro zone, analyses focusing on the Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries that joined the European Union are relatively scarce. 
The aim of this analysis is to verify the determinants of government bond 
spreads denominated in local currencies in 9 CEE countries. The econometric 
model, based on the work of Beirne – Fratzscher (2013), includes interactions 
between the explanatory variables and crisis dummies. This specification allows 
the coefficients to change two times in the examined period: during the global 
financial crisis and during the European debt crisis. Therefore, the changes in the 
pricing of sovereign risk can be analysed in the different phases of the crisis. The 
role of exchange rate risk is examined as well, following the recent literature on 
emerging economies (e.g. Gadanecz et al. 2014). 
Additionally, our econometric model is extended with dummy variables of 
sovereign credit ratings, in order to estimate the impact of every credit rating 
individually. Sovereign credit ratings are constructed by rating agencies based on 
various economic, social, and political determinants. According to the empirical 
literature, the economic determinants of ratings include inflation, external debt, 
default history, per capita income, and level of openness (Cantor – Packer 1996; 
Canuto et al. 2004). Ratings are important signals for investors, and seem to have 
an additional effect on spreads beyond the country macroeconomic fundamental 
variables, especially in the case of investment-status ratings (Jaramillo – Tejada 
2011; Cavallo et al. 2013).
In this paper, we follow the approach of Beirne – Fratzscher (2013) to define 
contagion as “the change in the way countries’ own fundamentals or regional 
risk are priced during a particular period, i.e. a change in the reaction of financial 
markets either in response to observable factors, such as changes in sovereign 
risk among neighbouring countries, or due to unobservables, such as herding be-
haviour of market participants” (op. cit.: 65). Wake-up call contagion is a change 
in the pricing of certain macroeconomic fundamentals during the crisis. Regional 
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contagion is a change in the pricing of regional risk. Pure contagion means herd-
ing behaviour or panic among investors. Some authors differentiate shift-conta-
gion as well, which means greater sensitivity to a common factor such as global 
risk aversion. This is a specific case of wake-up call contagion (Giordano et al. 
2013). 
The research hypotheses are the following: (i) The relationship between the 
macroeconomic fundamental variables and government bond spreads changed 
during the crises. (ii) The impact of macroeconomic fundamentals increased dur-
ing the global financial crisis, while the effect of regional risk strengthened dur-
ing the European debt crisis. (iii) Sovereign credit ratings are significant drivers 
of government bond spreads. 
During the financial crisis, investors focused more on cross-country differences 
and changes in macroeconomic fundamentals, which indicates wake-up call con-
tagion. In the period of the debt crisis, however, investors no longer differentiated 
strongly between the countries of the region. Government bond spreads were 
mainly driven by the average regional level of spreads, which suggests regional 
contagion. A significant impact of sovereign credit ratings implies that ratings 
contain additional information for investors. Therefore, sovereign credit ratings 
have an impact on government bond spreads on their own that is independent 
from macroeconomic fundamentals.
2. GOVERNMENT BOND SPREADS IN THE CEE COUNTRIES
The analysis focuses on the following CEE countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Croatia 
and Estonia, the remaining EU members of the region, are omitted from the analy-
sis due to insufficient data. Despite the similar geographical location and econom-
ic history, the analysed countries form a heterogeneous group. This is illustrated 
by the huge differences in the per capita income adjusted for purchasing power 
parity, which varied between 30 per cent (Bulgaria) and 80 per cent (Slovenia) of 
the EU-15 average in the period 2006–2008 (Staehr 2010). Furthermore, these 
countries use different exchange rate regimes. A few of them chose deeper integra-
tion by joining the European Monetary Union (EMU): Slovenia adopted the euro 
in 2007, Slovakia in 2009, Latvia in 2014 and Lithuania in 2015. This means that 
these countries had a fixed exchange rate for a large share of the examined time 
period. Bulgaria has a currency board arrangement, while Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, and Romania have floating exchange rates. 
The convergence of the CEE countries towards the EU-15 had been relatively 
fast in the period 2004–2007. These countries attracted one-third of all private 
238 KRISTÓF GYÓDI
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
capital inflows to emerging markets between 2002 and 2007 (Kattel 2010). For-
eign investments allowed the CEE countries to consume and borrow more during 
the pre-crisis period, thus foreign investments contributed to the fast economic 
growth and to the large current account deficits as well. Even though direct in-
vestments have been financing a large share of the current account deficits, the 
external financing needs of the region remained high (Vamvakidis 2009). 
The global financial crisis, however, abruptly ended this period of prosperity. 
The sudden fall of external demand and the evaporation of foreign funds severely 
struck the CEE countries. The recovery was rather slow due to the low growth in 
the euro zone, higher risk aversion, and decreased foreign investments.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 present bond yield spreads at secondary markets with 
10-year maturity in the CEE countries over Germany. Three different periods 
can be differentiated in the figures: the pre-crisis period (January 2001–August 
2008), the global financial crisis (September 2008–March 2010), and the Euro-
pean sovereign debt crisis (April 2010–July 2014).
In the pre-crisis period, the region seemed to be divided into two groups of 
countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Baltic coun-
tries had negligible spreads over German interest rates, while investors demanded 
higher interest from Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The average standard de-
viation of bond yields across countries has been relatively low: 1.27 percentage 
points (pp). The variance of government bond yields across countries became 
Fig 1. Annual government bond yield spreads over Germany in the period 2001–2014
Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat.
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much greater following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the average standard 
deviation increased to 3.15 pp. Bond yields rose sharply in the Baltic States (up to 
almost 15%, more than 11 pp above German yields), Hungary and Romania (up 
to 8% spreads). The rise in the cost of new debt caused severe liquidity problems 
in Hungary, Romania, and Latvia; these countries needed joint IMF/EU bailout 
programmes. Polish bond yields stagnated at around 6% during the global finan-
cial crisis. Poland increased its credibility with a “flexible credit line” agreement 
with the IMF (Staehr 2010). Slovakia and Slovenia, the two CEE members of 
the euro zone, along with the Czech Republic, managed to keep bond yields rela-
tively low, around the 5% level (2% higher than German interest rates).
At the beginning of 2010, bond spreads began to decrease in the region, and by 
the end of 2011, they had returned to the pre-crisis level. During this period, the 
European debt crisis developed, with high bond spreads in the EMU peripheral 
countries. This suggests that the initial phase of the euro zone crisis did not have 
a strong impact on the sovereign risk of the CEE region. Bond spreads increased 
once more at the beginning of 2012. This increase may have been caused by the 
uncertainty regarding the future of the EMU. However, spreads have been on a 
decreasing trend since 2013, primarily due to the more active role of the Euro-
pean Central Bank in stabilising the economy. The measures introduced by ECB 
President Mario Draghi included government bond purchasing programmes and 
quantitative easing programmes (Claeys et al. 2016). The average standard de-
viation of bond yields across CEE countries decreased to a similar level as in the 
pre-crisis period, to 1.45 pp. 
Fig 2. Annual government bond yield spreads over Germany in the period 2001–2014
Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat.
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3. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
There is a wide empirical literature on the determinants of government bond 
yields in advanced and emerging economies. Most of the authors analyse panel 
data and focus on fiscal variables. Poghosyan (2014) analyses the long-term and 
short-term drivers of interest rates using a panel of 22 advanced countries and 
panel cointegration techniques. Gruber – Kamin (2010), Laubach (2009), and Ar-
dagna et al. (2007) find robust and significant impact of debt and deficit on bond 
yields in advanced economies. Baldacci – Kumar (2010) examine a wide panel 
of 33 advanced and emerging economies and find a significant and non-linear 
relationship between long-term interest rates, debt, and deficit. Jaramillo – Weber 
(2012) show that during volatile periods, the impact of fiscal variables on sover-
eign bond spreads increases in emerging economies. Miyajima et al. (2015) find 
that during high market volatility, global factors can overwhelm domestic funda-
mentals in emerging markets. Alexopoulou et al. (2009) conclude that external 
debt, fiscal balance, inflation rate, trade openness, exchange rate, and short-term 
interest rate spreads are the most important long-run drivers of bond spreads in 
8 new EU countries. Gadanecz et al. (2014) show that exchange rate risk is a 
significant determinant of local government bond yields in emerging economies, 
finding a significant and robust positive impact of exchange rate volatility. Iara 
– Wolff (2014) present the significant impact of national fiscal governance and 
numerical fiscal rules on government bond spreads in the euro area, controlling 
for standard fiscal variables. 
This paper is based on the work of Beirne – Fratzscher (2013), who analyse 
the determinants of sovereign risk and the presence of contagion in the period 
2000–2011 in a panel of 10 euro zone economies, 7 advanced countries outside 
the euro zone and 14 emerging economies. The benchmark model includes five 
macroeconomic fundamental variables: debt to GDP, fiscal balance to GDP, real 
GDP growth, the current account balance, and the global market volatility, prox-
ied by the VIX index (the CBOE Volatility Index is a widely used measure for 
expected stock market volatility). The authors find that sovereign spreads were 
driven by public debt, GDP growth, and the regional price of sovereign risk be-
fore the crisis. The emerging economies were more sensitive to public debt and 
fiscal balance than the advanced economies. During the crisis, spreads became 
much more sensitive to fundamentals in the euro zone, especially in the periph-
eral countries, while the relationship stayed almost the same in the case of the 
emerging economies. This result suggests the presence of wake-up call contagion 
in the euro zone. An important finding is that regional contagion has been unim-
portant during the crisis: cross-country transmission of sovereign risk decreased, 
especially in the euro zone. Giordano et al. (2013) focus on the euro area and con-
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clude that the sharp increase in spreads was caused by wake-up call contagion, 
but no pure contagion took place. Gómez-Puig – Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) also 
confirm a wake-up call contagion in the euro zone and find evidence in favour of 
regional contagion as well. 
Numerous papers focus on changes in cross-country linkages, with the usage 
of different time-series methodologies (VAR, GARCH, Engel and Granger two-
step method, etc.). The authors confirm time-variant spillover effects in the euro 
zone (Antonakakis et al. 2013; Leschinski – Bertram 2013; Gómez-Puig et al. 
2014). Relevant to the CEE countries, Claeys et al. (2014) find that the country-
specific effects explain a larger share of bond spreads variation in Poland, Hun-
gary, and the Czech Republic than in the euro zone countries. 
4. THE METHODOLOGY
The theoretical framework of our model is based on the work of Beirne – Fratzscher 
(2013). The basis of the econometric model is the definition of sovereign risk. 
Sovereign risk (the credit risk of operations involving credit for sovereign states) 
is determined by credit risk, liquidity risk and risk appetite: 
  (1)
where r is the government bond yield of a given country relative to a risk-free 
asset (spread), (1-P(X)) is the probability of default, (1 – μ) is the loss in case of 
default, Ω is the risk premium, and ϕ is the liquidity premium. 
The government bond spread is the difference between the yield to maturity 
of a given country’s government bond and the respective yield to maturity of 
another country’s government bond. The government bond used as a reference is 
usually nearly risk-free, e.g. the German government bond (Ebner 2009).
The econometric model used to verify the research hypotheses is a coun-
try fixed-effects panel data model. Country fixed-effects allow controlling for 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity may in-
clude factors affecting sovereign risk such as institutions, the level of democ-
racy, history, etc. 
The simplest form of the model is the following: 
  (2)
where ri,t is the government bond spread, α0 is the common intercept, αi is the 
country fixed-effect, Xk,i,t is a vector with the determinants of the government 
bond yields, Sj,i,t is the regional price of sovereign risk, and εi,t is the error term. 
   1 1r P X       
, 0 , , 1 , , ,i t i k k i t j i t i tr X S        
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Sj,i,t is the unweighted average of the CEE government bond spreads in time t, 
excluding country i itself. Therefore, the coefficient γ1 measures the impact of the 
regional sovereign risk on the sovereign risk of the individual countries.
This basic model is modified in order to allow a shift in the coefficients over 
time. The extended model can be used to identify contagion-effects. The model 
takes the following form:
  (3)
where DtF is a dummy for the global financial crisis, while DtD is a dummy for 
the European debt crisis. This specification allows the coefficients to change two 
times in the examined period. The dummy for the global financial crisis takes 
the value of 1 between October 2008 and March 2010. The standard starting date 
of the global financial crisis is September 15, 2008, when the Lehman Brothers 
went bankrupt. April 2010 is chosen as the starting date for the debt crisis, as 
in the analysis of Suh (2015). Greece requested a loan from the EU and IMF in 
April 2010, which was followed by S&P’s downgrade of the Greek sovereign 
debt to BB+ (which is already in the non-investment or “junk bond” category). 
An alternative starting date is October 2009, when the Greek government revised 
its budget deficit numbers. Giordano et al. (2013) and Gómez-Puig et al. (2014) 
use this date among others. However, the later starting date allows a better as-
sessment of the true impact of the debt crisis in the CEE region, as the euro zone 
sovereign bond spreads began to increase sharply only from April 2010 (Lane 
2012). Therefore, DtD takes the value of 1 from April 2010. The fiscal situation of 
Greece is still not stable; there is no established end date for the debt crisis. The 
examined time period ends with July 2014 in this analysis. 
With this framework, the drivers of sovereign risk can be assessed in three dif-
ferent periods. During the pre-crisis period (January 2001–September 2008), the 
relationship between bond yields and macroeconomic fundamentals is measured 
by βk. During the global financial crisis (October 2008–March 2010), the impact 
is given by βk + βk' . During the debt crisis (April 2010–July 2014), the corre-
sponding value is βk + βk''. A statistically significant change in the coefficients 
means wake-up call contagion. The impact of regional risk can be measured the 
same way by γ1, γ1' and γ1''. A statistically significant change in the coefficients 
means regional contagion. The next section describes the details of the data set.
 
 
' '
, 0 , , 1 , , , , 1 ,
'' ''
, , 1 , , , ,
F
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5. THE DATA SET
The dependent variable of the model is the government bond spread, derived as 
the difference between the local currency government bond yields of CEE coun-
tries and the corresponding German bond yield. The data originate from the EMU 
convergence criterion series that present interest rates for long-term government 
bonds, denominated in national currencies. The time series cover the period from 
January 2001 to July 2014. Countries with shorter periods of observations are the 
following: for Bulgaria, data is available from January 2003, for Romania from 
April 2005, and for Slovenia from March 2002. The spread is interpreted in per-
centages per annum multiplied by 100. 
The following macroeconomic variables are used.
GDP growth: cyclical developments in output growth affect long-term interest 
rates in the short-run. While potential output growth has a positive effect on real 
bond yields (Poghosyan 2014), short-run GDP growth has a negative impact on 
bond yields. GDP growth is associated with a decrease in sovereign risk, as the 
country’s taxing capacity increases.
Real short-term interest rates: a tighter monetary policy should lead to higher 
short-term and long-term interest rates. Money market rates are used to control 
for monetary policy in empirical works.
Current account balance: it reveals the exposure of a country to the rest of the 
world. A current account deficit is a sign that the country is spending abroad more 
than its earnings from foreign transactions, thus the country is becoming a net 
debtor towards the rest of the world. The expected impact is thus negative.
Government debt: public debt can affect bond yields through two main chan-
nels: the crowding out of private investments by fiscal expansion (Elmendorf 
et al. 1999) and by increasing the risk premium. Additionally, higher govern-
ment debt can create uncertainty for the monetary policy, as central banks have a 
greater incentive to monetise government debt. 
Primary balance ratio: the primary government deficit ratio reflects the cy-
clical fiscal policy developments. A negative relationship is expected between 
long-term interest rates and deficit, as an improvement in the balance ratio lowers 
sovereign risk.
Besides the standard control variables suggested by the literature, the role of 
exchange rate risk is examined as well. Exchange rate risk, which may be of high 
importance in the case of the emerging economies, is expected to have a positive 
impact on sovereign risk. Exchange rate risk may affect fiscal sustainability for 
several reasons. Firstly, unfavourable changes in the exchange rate create losses 
for foreign investors on their bond positions. Secondly, large currency mismatch-
es of the banking or household sector balance sheets may pose a threat for the fi-
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nancial system. Exchange rate risk may also reduce foreign demand for domestic 
assets, thus reducing liquidity in financial markets (Gadanecz et al. 2014). These 
arguments imply that causality runs from exchange rate risk to sovereign risk. On 
the other hand, the direction of causality is not entirely clear. Foreign exchange 
rate markets are more liquid than sovereign debt markets, therefore investors 
often hedge their bond positions on the foreign exchange market. In this case, the 
higher volatility of the government bond market can affect exchange rates as well 
(Gadanecz et al. 2014). Exchange rate risk is controlled for with two variables: 
change in the exchange rate and exchange rate volatility. Change in the exchange 
rate measures the percentage change of average quarterly exchange rate against 
the euro. Exchange rate volatility is measured by the coefficient of variation. The 
coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the average) is calculated 
from daily exchange rates against the euro. The advantage of this measure over 
the simple standard deviation is that it solves the problem of different units that 
the different exchange rates present. 
All variables are in quarterly frequency. The variables with a seasonal compo-
nent are seasonally adjusted.
Furthermore, three other determinants are included in the model: global risk, 
sovereign credit ratings, and fiscal rules. VIX index: the CBOE Volatility Index 
is widely used to control for the common global risk factor. The index, based on 
the S&P 500 Index, measures stock market volatility. An increase of global risk 
should lead to an increase of government bond yields, especially in the case of 
emerging countries. Sovereign credit ratings: ratings are added to the model to 
test the hypothesis that they are significant drivers of government bond yields. 
The data set includes the long-term local currency sovereign ratings by Fitch. 
First, the ratings were transformed into numeric values from 1 (rating D) to 24 
(rating AAA). In practice, the ratings varied between 10 (rating B) and 22 (rat-
ing AA) in the examined period. Second, the ratings have been transformed into 
dummy variables, as in Jaramillo – Tejada (2011), in order to assess the impact 
of every rating separately. Fiscal rules: numerical fiscal rules decrease spreads by 
reducing the probability of default. Similarly to Iara – Wolff (2014), the fiscal rule 
index is used in the empirical analysis.1 The index is based on five dimensions, 
describing fiscal rules at the local, sub-national, or national level: the statutory 
base of the rule, room for revising objectives, mechanisms of monitoring compli-
ance with and enforcement of the rule, the existence of enforcement mechanisms, 
and media visibility of the rule. A comprehensive time-varying fiscal rule index 
for each EU member state was constructed by summing up all fiscal rule strength 
1  The dataset is accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/
fiscal _governance/index_en.htm.
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indices in force in the respective Member State weighted by the coverage of 
general government finances of the respective rule (Iara – Wolff 2014). As the 
index is updated only on an annual basis, it has been transformed into quarterly 
frequency (the annual value was assigned to the quarterly values). 
The source of the data is the Eurostat for most of the variables. The values of 
the VIX index are provided by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE); 
data on sovereign ratings originate from Fitch Ratings, central banks and minis-
tries of finance, while the fiscal rule index is obtained from the European Com-
mission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. 
7. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The regressions are estimated using the fixed-effects estimation method. The 
Hausman test showed systematic differences between the random-effects and 
fixed-effects estimators, therefore the consistent fixed-effects estimator is used 
(Table 1). In order to estimate the country fixed-effects, the least square dummy 
variable estimator is implemented. 
The VIF test (variance inflation factor) was carried out to check for multicol-
linearity. If the explanatory variables are strongly correlated to each other, the 
standard errors may be biased. The results suggest that there are no high correla-
tions among the variables, including the dummy variables for credit ratings: the 
average VIF value is below 3. There are different views on which VIF level poses 
a problem; usually a value above 10 needs attention. 
The results of the estimations are presented in Table 1. For the pre-crisis period 
βk, for the financial crisis period βk', while for the debt crisis period βk'' is reported. 
This means that the coefficients for the financial crisis and the debt crisis period 
show the relative change to the pre-crisis period: when both βk  and βk', or βk and 
βk'' are significant, the sum βk + βk' gives the impact of the variable during the fi-
nancial crisis period, and βk + βk'' during the debt crisis period. The same applies 
for the coefficients of regional contagion γ1, γ1' and γ1''.
7.1. Regression without credit ratings
Firstly, the model specification without credit ratings is analysed. The results 
confirm that macroeconomic fundamentals are the main drivers of CEE govern-
ment bond spreads: GDP growth, government debt, current account balance and 
money market interest rates are statistically significant determinants. Following 
a percentage point increase of the GDP growth, spreads decreased by around 6 
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Table 1. Results of fixed-effects regressions 
VARIABLES (1)Spread
(2)
Spread
Pre-crisis (β k,γ i)
Regional bond spreads –0.012 0.113
GDP growth –0.057** –0.029
VIX index 0.007 0.001
Money market interest rates 0.301*** 0.275***
Primary balance to GDP –0.046 –0.030
Current account balance to GDP 0.0705*** 0.023
Government debt to GDP 0.039*** 0.032***
Exchange rate change –0.011 0.001
Exchange rate volatility 8.786 12.53
Fiscal rules –0.120 –0.142
Rating: BBplus 2.675***
Rating: BBBminus 1.441*
Rating: BBB 1.708***
Rating: BBBplus 1.192**
Rating: Aminus 1.066**
Rating: A 0.861*
Rating: Aplus 0.719
Rating: AAminus 0.705
Global Financial Crisis (β k ' ,γ 1' )
Regional bond spreads –0.542*** –0.677***
GDP growth –0.312*** –0.288***
VIX index 0.022 0.017
Money market interest rates –0.150** –0.374***
Primary balance to GDP –0.156*** 0.019
Current account balance to GDP –0.094** –0.082*
Government debt to GDP 0.026** –0.019
Exchange rate change 0.031 0.014
Exchange rate volatility –46.35** –25.78
Fiscal rules 0.559* 0.905*
Rating: BBBminus 6.586***
Rating: BBB 2.695**
Rating: BBBplus 6.718***
Rating: Aminus 8.102***
Rating: A 3.271*
Rating: Aplus 3.741**
Rating: AAminus 3.991**
Rating: AA 1.624
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Table 1. continued
VARIABLES (1)Spread
(2)
Spread
European Debt Crisis  (β k ' ' ,γ 1' ' )
Regional bond spreads 0.223 0.553***
GDP growth –0.106** –0.025
VIX index 0.035 0.051***
Money market interest rates 0.074 –0.036
Primary balance to GDP 0.02 0.003
Current account balance to GDP 0.039 0.055
Government debt to GDP 0.003 0.003
Exchange rate change –0.014 –0.022
Exchange rate volatility –21.93 –25.37*
Fiscal rules –0.002 0.212
Rating: BBBminus –0.344
Rating: BBB –1.305**
Rating: BBBplus –1.698**
Rating: Aminus –1.281*
Rating: A –1.332*
Rating: Aplus –1.336*
Rating: AAminus –1.877**
Rating: AA –2.580***
Bulgaria 2.309*** 0.766
Czech Republic –0.0233 –0.02
Latvia 2.201*** 1.247**
Lithuania 1.875*** 0.939*
Poland 0.163 0.351
Romania 2.792*** 1.725***
Slovenia 0.343 1.454***
Slovakia 0.221 –0.069
Constant –1.600** –2.370***
R-squared 0.829 0.91
Observations 418 418
Source: Own calculations. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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basis points in the pre-crisis period. A 1 pp increase of government debt increased 
spreads by 4 basis points, although the government deficit was not significant. 
The current account balance had a positive coefficient; however, the expected 
sign is negative, as a current account deficit contributes to the growth of external 
debt. On the other hand, the pre-crisis period has been characterised by increasing 
current account deficits and decreasing long-term interest rates in the CEE region 
(Giday 2013). This suggests that investors were not sensitive to the substantial 
current account deficits during the pre-crisis period.
The results also reveal that government bond spreads were not driven by re-
gional risk during the pre-crisis period, as the average regional spreads were in-
significant. This may imply that investors assessed the sovereign risk of CEE 
countries individually already before the financial crisis. The VIX index, vari-
ables on exchange rate volatility and currency depreciation, and fiscal rules were 
also insignificant. 
During the financial crisis, the relationship between spreads and their deter-
minants changed, which signals contagion. The impact of regional bond spreads 
became significant and highly negative, which is unusual, as it means that due to 
increasing regional risk, the spreads of the individual countries decreased. This 
may imply a strong divergence among the CEE bond yields. As it has been dis-
cussed earlier, euro zone members and Poland did not witness sudden increases 
in the bond yields during the financial crisis, unlike others, especially the Baltic 
States and Romania. 
The impact of the macroeconomic variables significantly increased, which is 
a strong indicator for wake-up call contagion. The impact of economic growth 
jumped from 6 basis points to around 37 (5.7+31.2) basis points, and the impact 
of the current account balance became negative: spreads decreased by 2.4 (7.05-
9.4) basis points, following a 1 pp improvement of the balance. Regarding fiscal 
variables, deficit became significant with almost 16 basis points impact, and the 
impact of government debt increased from 3.9 to 6.5 basis points. The effective-
ness of monetary policy declined, as the impact of money market rates halved 
(from 30 basis points to 15 basis points). 
The coefficient for the impact of exchange rate volatility was significant and 
strongly negative during the financial crisis. Following a unit increase in the co-
efficient of variation, bond spreads decreased by more than 46 pp. This is an 
interesting finding, as it suggests that the high variance of exchange rates helped 
to decrease sovereign risk in the CEE countries with free floating exchange rate 
regimes. During times of high volatility on the financial markets, exchange rates 
absorbed much of the external shock. Fiscal rules also became significant (at the 
10% significance level), with a positive impact. As fiscal rules are revised only 
on an annual basis, this result should be interpreted in caution. 
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During the debt crisis, the relationship between the macroeconomic funda-
mentals and sovereign risk returned to the levels observed in the pre-crisis period. 
The exception is GDP growth, which remained a strong factor in the pricing of 
sovereign risk, although with a lesser impact than during the financial crisis (16.3 
basis points impact: 5.7+10.6). The pricing of the other variables did not change 
relative to the pre-crisis periods. 
The country fixed-effects control for the unobserved heterogeneity across 
countries. The impact of the fixed-effects are estimated relative to Hungary: 
they are significant and positive in the case of the Baltic countries, Romania and 
Bulgaria. 
In sum, our results suggest that investors assessed the sovereign risk of CEE 
countries individually during the entire analysed time period, based on the differ-
ences in macroeconomic fundamentals. The results indicate wake-up call conta-
gion during the financial crisis, as the increase of spreads during the global finan-
cial crisis was mainly driven by the decline in economic output, increasing budget 
deficits and debt. During the debt crisis, investors priced sovereign risk similarly 
as during the pre-crisis period. The results reveal no regional contagion during 
the crises. The analysis provides an interesting discovery concerning exchange 
rate risk: the countries with free-floating exchange rates benefited from the high 
volatility of their currencies during the crises. This is in line with the findings of 
Jahjah et al. (2012), who analyse the impact of exchange rate regimes on foreign 
currency denominated government bond yields in 42 emerging countries. The 
authors conclude that countries with free-floating exchange rate regimes have 
significantly lower spreads. The analysis does not support the important role of 
fiscal rules in pricing sovereign risk in CEE countries. 
It is interesting to place the results in the context of the empirical literature. 
The estimated impact of macroeconomic variables is similar to the results of 
other authors. The impact of debt (4–6.5 basis points following a 1 pp increase) is 
in the range of the 2–7 basis points as reported by Baldacci – Kumar (2010) and 
Poghosyan (2014). 
The estimated impact of deficit (16 basis points during the financial crisis) 
is similar to the results of others: e.g. Jaramillo – Weber (2012) report a 13–15 
basis points increase for the period 2005–2011. The positive impact of the net 
current account in emerging economies is also observed by other authors, includ-
ing Beirne – Fratzscher (2013) as well. The impact of GDP growth (6–37 basis 
points) seems reasonable too: e.g. Miyajima et al. (2015) report 27 basis points. 
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7.2. Regressions with credit rating data
Next, the previous specification of the model is extended with sovereign credit 
ratings by Fitch Ratings. The results of the regressions are presented in the sec-
ond column of Table 1. 
The results show that sovereign credit ratings significantly affect government 
bond spreads, even after controlling for macroeconomic fundamentals. The es-
timated coefficients prove that better credit ratings are associated with lower 
spreads. The greatest effect is associated with a change between ratings BBB- 
and BB+, which means a downgrade into the “junk bond” (non-investment) cat-
egory. Such downgrade is associated with a higher increase of spreads (1.2 pp 
increase) rather than with a change within the investment category. The measured 
coefficient for government debt is less relative to the basic estimation, while GDP 
growth and the current account balance are insignificant. 
The coefficients for credit ratings were very high during the financial crisis, 
which reflects the significant increase of bond yields. Furthermore, as credit rat-
ings change relatively rarely, their interaction with the crisis dummy (βkDtF) cap-
tures part of the unexplained variance during the financial crisis. 
The impact of money market rates turned negative: following a 1 pp decrease 
of short-term interest rates, spreads increased by almost 10 basis points (27.5–
37.4). This suggests the impairment of monetary transmission channels during 
the crisis in the CEE countries. 
The impact of regional bond spreads is again significant and negative, similarly 
to the base regression. This suggests a strong divergence between the sovereign 
risk of the CEE countries, as the huge increase of spreads in the more crisis-struck 
countries (Baltic countries, Romania, and Hungary) may have diverted investors 
towards the more stabile economies of the region. 
Regarding macroeconomic variables, GDP growth is a strong indicator for in-
vestors during the financial crisis in this specification of the model as well (28.8 
basis points impact); however, the impact of fiscal variables did not change relative 
to the pre-crisis period (as the variables interacted with the crisis dummy are insig-
nificant). However, the results show that investors paid additional attention to the 
current account balance (8 basis points impact). These results suggest that the wake-
up call contagion was restricted to changes in the output and current account bal-
ance, while investors did not change the pricing of fiscal variables during the crisis. 
The coefficients for credit ratings reflect the lower level of interest rates dur-
ing the debt crisis. The impact of regional bond spreads became significant and 
positive (following a percentage point increase of regional spreads, individual 
spreads rose by 55 basis points). This signals that the region’s sovereign risk 
started to influence the spreads of the individual countries, which was not the 
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case before 2012. Investors may have begun to assess the sovereign risk of CEE 
countries viewing the whole region together, which means regional contagion. 
The VIX index became statistically significant with a p-value of less than 5%. 
This change suggests shift-contagion: bond yields became more sensitive to a 
common, external factor. This supports that CEE countries were affected prima-
rily by the uncertainties and vulnerability of the euro zone, and not by macroeco-
nomic shocks within the region. Furthermore, the higher exchange rate volatility 
is again associated with a negative impact on spreads. 
In sum, the results suggest a weaker relationship between macroeconomic 
fundamentals and spreads, once sovereign ratings are controlled for. During the 
financial crisis, the impact of GDP growth intensified, which shows wake-up call 
contagion, although the pricing of fiscal variables did not change. There is addi-
tional evidence for the negative impact of exchange rate volatility during the debt 
crises. The results are robust for wake-up call contagion, while there is also some 
evidence for regional contagion during the debt crisis. 
As robustness tests, two more specifications are verified. Firstly, the examined 
time period is shortened, therefore the debt crisis period is between April 2010 
and December 2012. The main conclusions are unchanged: the pricing of sover-
eign risk returned to the pre-crisis relationships during the debt crisis, with mixed 
evidence on regional contagion. 
The second robustness test examines the significantly negative impact of re-
gional risk on spreads during the debt crisis. Four countries are left out from the 
panel: Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, and Romania. The regressions on a restricted 
panel suggest that the impact of regional risk during the financial crisis did not 
change, thus the negative impact observed in the whole panel was indeed caused 
by the divergent trends of government bond yields in the less stable countries of 
the region2. 
8. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of our research was the analysis of government bond spreads in the CEE 
countries. Using an econometric model based on the work of Beirne – Fratzscher 
(2013), the determinants of sovereign risk were assessed in three different pe-
riods: before the crisis (January 2001–September 2008), during the global fi-
nancial crisis (October 2008–March 2010), and during the European debt crisis 
(April 2010–July 2014). The presented methodology enabled the examination of 
contagion-effects separately in each phase of the crisis. 
2 The results of these robustness tests are available from the author upon request.
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The results of the empirical analysis confirm the significant relationship be-
tween sovereign risk and fiscal variables, economic output growth, and short-
term interest rates. The results also support the hypothesis that the impact of 
macroeconomic fundamentals changed during the crises. Financial markets be-
came more sensitive to the fundamental variables during the global financial cri-
sis, especially to output growth, which signals wake-up call contagion. Investors 
strongly distinguished countries based on macroeconomic fundamentals, and did 
not price sovereign risk based on the regional level of government bond yields. 
This finding suggests that the pricing of sovereign risk in the CEE region changed 
in a similar way as in the euro zone periphery countries. A key contribution of 
the paper to the literature is the separate analysis of sovereign risk during the 
European debt crisis. The results suggest that investors returned to the pre-crisis 
assessment of risk; however, the role of regional risk increased, which may signal 
regional contagion. 
The analysis also showed that sovereign credit ratings have a significant im-
pact on government bond yields throughout the whole period. The results suggest 
that investors price government bonds yields to a large extent based on credit 
ratings. However, the results do not show a significant impact of fiscal rules on 
spreads in the CEE countries. 
The analysis also provides evidence on the significant role of exchange rate 
volatility on sovereign risk. The analysis supports that free-floating exchange 
rate regimes are beneficial during volatile periods. These findings are in line with 
the empirical works of other authors concerning advanced and emerging econo-
mies. 
REFERENCES
Alexopoulou, I. – Bunda, I. – Ferrando, A. (2010): Determinants of Government Bond Spreads in 
New EU Countries. Eastern European Economics, 48(5): 5–37.
Antonakakis, N. – Vergos, K. (2013): Sovereign Bond Yield Spillovers in the Euro Zone during the 
Financial and Debt Crisis. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 
26: 258–272.
Ardagna S. – Caselli, F. – Lane T. (2007): Fiscal Discipline and the Cost of Public Debt Service: 
Some Estimates for OECD Countries. The BE Journal of Macroeconomics, 7(1): 1–33.
Attinasi, M. – Checherita-Westphal, C. – Nickel, C. (2009): What Explains the Surge in Euro Area 
Sovereign Spreads during the Financial Crisis of 2007–09? Working Paper, No. 1131, European 
Central Bank. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1520351
Baldacci, E. – Kumar, M. (2010): Fiscal Defi cits, Public Debt, and Sovereign Bond Yields. 
Working Paper, No. 184, IMF. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1669865
Barrios, S. – Iversen, P. – Lewandowska, M. – Setzer, R. (2009): Determinants of Intra-Euro Area 
Government Bond Spreads during the Financial Crisis. European Economy-Economic Paper, 
GOVERNMENT BOND SPREADS IN THE CEE COUNTRIES 253
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
No. 388. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_fi nance/publications/publication16255_
en.pdf
Beirne, J. – Fratzscher, M. (2013): The Pricing of Sovereign Risk and Contagion during the Euro-
pean Sovereign Debt Crisis. Journal of International Money and Finance, 34: 60–82.
Cantor, R. – Packer, F. (1996): Determinants and Impact of Sovereign Credit Ratings. Economic 
Policy Review, 2(2): 37–54.
Canuto, O. – Dos Santos, P. – de Sá Porto, P. (2004): Macroeconomics and Sovereign Risk Rat-
ings. World Bank. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources 
/ratingsUSP.pdf
Cavallo, E. – Powell, A. – Rigobon, R. (2013): Do Credit Rating Agencies Add Value? Evidence 
from the Sovereign Rating Business. International Journal of Finance & Economics, 18(3): 
240–265.
Claeys, P. – Vašíček, B. (2014): Measuring Bilateral Spillover and Testing Contagion on Sovereign 
Bond Markets in Europe. Journal of Banking & Finance, 46(C): 151–165.
Claeys, G. – Darvas, Zs. – Leandro, A. (2016): A Proposal to Revive the European Fiscal Frame-
work. Bruegel Policy Contribution. Available at: http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/
pc_2016_07.pdf
Darvas, Zs. (2010): The Impact of the Crisis on Budget Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. 
OECD Journal on Budgeting, 10(1): 1–42.
Ebner, A. (2009): An empirical analysis on the determinants of CEE government bond spreads. 
Emerging Markets Review 10(2): 97–121.
Elmendorf, D. – Mankiw, N. (1999): Government Debt. Working Paper, No. 6470, NBER. Avail-
able at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w6470.pdf
Gadanecz, B. – Miyajima, K. – Shu, C. (2014): Exchange Rate Risk and Local Currency Sovereign 
Bond Yields in Emerging Markets. Working Paper, No. 474, BIS. Available at: http://www.bis.
org/publ/work474.htm
Giday, A. (2013): Indebtedness in Central and Eastern Europe – Eight years of New EU Members. 
Public Finance Quarterly, 58(3): 271–292.
Giordano, R. – Pericoli, M.– Tommasino, P. (2013): Pure or Wake-up-Call Contagion? Another 
Look at the EMU Sovereign Debt Crisis. International Finance, 16(2): 131–160.
Gruber, J. – Kamin, S. (2010): Fiscal Positions and Government Bond Yields in OECD Countries. 
International Finance Discussion Papers, No. 1011. Available at: http://www.federalreserve.
gov/pubs/ifdp/2010/1011/ifdp1011.pdf
Gómez-Puig, M. – Sosvilla-Rivero, S. – del Carmen Ramos-Herrera, M. (2014): An Update on 
EMU Sovereign Yield Spread Drivers in Times of Crisis: A Panel Data Analysis. The North 
American Journal of Economics and Finance, 30: 133–153.
Gómez-Puig, M. – Sosvilla-Rivero, S. (2014): Causality and Contagion in EMU Sovereign Debt 
Markets. International Review of Economics & Finance, 33: 12–27.
Iara, A. – Wolff, G. B. (2014): Rules and Risk in the Euro Area. European Journal of Political 
Economy, 34(C): 222–236.
Jahjah, S. – Wei, B. – Zhanwei Yue, V. (2012): Exchange Rate Policy and Sovereign Bond Spreads 
in Developing Countries. International Finance Discussion Papers, No. 1049. Available at: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2012/1049/ifdp1049.pdf
Jaramillo, L. – Tejada, M. (2011): Sovereign Credit Ratings and Spreads in Emerging Markets: 
Does Investment Grade Matter? Working Paper, No. 44, IMF. Available at: http://www10.iadb.
org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2011/07826.pdf
254 KRISTÓF GYÓDI
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
Jaramillo, L. – Weber, A. (2012): Bond Yields in Emerging Economies: It Matters What State 
You Are in. Working Paper, No. 198, IMF. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1780802
Kattel, R. (2010): Financial and Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe. Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics, 33(1): 41–60.
Lane, P. (2012): The European Sovereign Debt Crisis. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
26(3): 49–67.
Laubach, T. (2009): New Evidence on the Interest Rate Effects of Budget Defi cits and Debt. Jour-
nal of the European Economic Association, 7(4): 858–885.
Leschinski, C. – Bertram, P. (2013): Contagion Dynamics in EMU Government Bond Spreads. 
Hannover Economic Papers (HEP), available at: 
http://diskussionspapiere.wiwi.uni-hannover.de/pdf_bib/dp-515.pdf
Ludwig, A. (2014): A Unifi ed Approach to Investigate Pure and Wake-Up-Call Contagion: Evi-
dence from the Eurozone’s First Financial Crisis. Journal of International Money and Finance, 
48: 125–146.
Miyajima, K. – Mohanty, M. – Chan, T. (2015): Emerging Market Local Currency Bonds: Diversi-
fi cation and Stability. Emerging Markets Review, 22(C): 126–139.
Mundell, R. (1963): Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange 
Rates. Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques 
et science politique, 29(4): 475–485.
Poghosyan, T. (2014): Long-run and Short-run Determinants of Sovereign Bond Yields in Ad-
vanced Economies. Economic Systems, 38(1): 100–114.
Staehr, K. (2010): The Global Financial Crisis and Public Finances in the New EU Countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe. Public Finance and Management, 10(4): 671–712.
Suh, S. (2015): Measuring Sovereign Risk Contagion in the Eurozone. International Review of 
Economics & Finance, 35: 45–65.
Vamvakidis, A. (2009): Convergence in Emerging Europe: Sustainability and Vulnerabilities. East-
ern European Economics, 47(3): 5–27.
Von Hagen, J. – Schuknecht, L. – Wolswijk, G. (2011): Government Bond Risk Premiums in the 
EU Revisited: The Impact of the Financial Crisis. European Journal of Political Economy, 
27(1): 36–43.
GOVERNMENT BOND SPREADS IN THE CEE COUNTRIES 255
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
APPENDIX
Table A1. The Hausman test
Variable (b)
Fixed
(B)
Random
(b-B) 
Difference
sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) S.E.
growth –.0571084 –.097531 .0404226 
def stock ~p –.0454706 .0214987 –.0669694
bop gp .0704591 .0126905 .0577686
debt .0393094 .0012077 .0381017 .0057227
vix quart .0064485 –.0175091 .0239576
mmr quart .3006235 .3584063 –.0577828 .0196586
spread qua~n –.0117437 –.1232158 .1114721
dep_quart –.0111333 .0641079 –.0752412
cv_quart 8.785723 11.69063 –2.90491
growth_cr –.3121522 –.3453255 .0331732
def sto~p cr –.1560088 –.2578427 .1018339
bop gp cr –.0935489 –.0705319 –.023017
debt_cr .0261904 .0338826 –.0076923
vix_quart_cr .0223718 .0232894 –.0009176
mmr_quart_cr –.1498743 –.0029968 –.1468775
spread qua~r –.5418299 –.6442251 .1023952
cv_quart_cr –46.3515 –81.37078 35.01919
dep_quart_cr .0307543 –.0047472 .0355015
growth_fc –.1060074 .1331489 –.2391563
def sto~p fc .0198112 –.0463042 .0661154
bop gp fc .0394344 .213595 –.1741606
debt_fc .0034275 –.0140768 .0175043
vix_quart_fc .0351873 .0407224 –.0055351
mmr_quart_fc .0739657 .4134437 –.339478
spread_qua~c .2235 .6174698 –.3939699
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(12) = (b-B)’[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
= 330.97
Prob>chi2 =0.0000
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
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Table A2. The results of the VIF test
Variable VIF 1/VIF
qratingA 4.79 0.208554
qratingAplus 4.35 0.229997
qrat~BBBplus 3.79 0.263745
qratingBBB 3.40 0.294489
qratingAA 3.15 0.317343
spread qua~n 3.06 0.326541
growth 2.95 0.338780
mmr quart 2.70 0.370340
bop gp 2.60 0.384654
qra~BBBminus 2.60 0.384954
qratingAmi~s 2.36 0.423141
cv_quart 2.09 0.478933
vix_quart 2.03 0.493066
debt 1.89 0.528257
def stock ~p 1.71 0.585855
fri_quart 1.47 0.681940
dep_quart 1.26 0.791234
qratingBBp~s 1.15 0.872704
Mean VIF 2.63
